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A. The Problem

12/28/2015 14:43:02

Consider a hypothetical scenario in which Small Inventor, Inc.,
located in Colorado, works long hours to perfect a wristwatch-like pedometer capable of wirelessly receiving calibration data from a remote computer and comprising a sophisticated motion-control
mechanism, which makes the device particularly accurate. Small Inventor, Inc. attends a trade show, where she is unpleasantly surprised
to see that the market of personal fitness trackers is already saturated
with sophisticated products from FitBit™, Jawbone™, and similar
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1. LOT User Fee Schedule, LOTNET, http://www.lotnet.com/how-to-join-lotnet/LOT_User_Fees.cfm (last visited Aug. 29, 2015).
2. See Jonathan E. Kemmerer & Jiaqing Lu, Profitability and Royalty Rates Across Industries: Some Preliminary Evidence, KPMG GLOBAL VALUATION INST. (Nov. 2012),
http://law.unh.edu/assets/images/uploads/pages/ipmanagement-royalty-rates.pdf (the average
2007 royalty rate in the software industry was approximately 11%).
3. Medical Devices, Inc. is a fictional company created for the purposes of this hypothetical. The hypothetical scenario was informed by a 2014 publication in Biomedical Optics Express, in which a team of researchers described an experimental, wristwatch-like, touchless
glucose monitor. See Nisan Ozana et al., Improved Noncontact Optical Sensor for Detection of
Glucose Concentration and Indication of Dehydration Level, 5 BIOMEDICAL OPTICS EXPRESS
1926 (2014), http://www.opticsinfobase.org/boe/fulltext.cfm?uri=boe-5-6-1926&id=286417
[hereinafter Ozana] (the monitor includes a bracelet with a built-in camera and is “based on
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manufacturers. The small inventor has no chance of competing because, as it turns out, current end users are more concerned with
multi-functionality of wearable fitness devices than precision. Discouraged, the small inventor returns home, scales down production of motion-sensitive pedometers, and sells them to a limited number of local
stores.
To further exacerbate the small inventor’s frustration, two weeks
later she receives a demand letter from a “patent troll”, alleging that
the remote calibration component of her pedometer product infringes
a client/server database patent and demanding that she take a license. Small Inventor, Inc. begrudgingly agrees to do so, even though
she disagrees that wirelessly receiving instructions for calibrating a
pedometer is anything like sending data to a server for storage in a
database.
The small inventor realizes that the “patent troll” sent a bulk mailing to many tradeshow participants but larger companies simply ignored the letter. Many of these companies are already members of
defensive licensing programs that mitigate the risk of being sued for
infringement. The annual cost of participating can be as high as
$20,000,1 which is prohibitive for Small Inventor, Inc. Furthermore, the
small inventor, unlike large companies, would be unable to afford defending an infringement action in court, so she chooses to take a license and agrees to pay an 11% royalty2 on her profits.
In the meantime, six thousand miles away in Israel, a medical
device company, Medical Devices, Inc., makes a scientific breakthrough and invents a touchless blood glucose monitor, which
measures a diabetic patient’s blood sugar level without drawing
blood.3 The wristwatch-like monitor consists of an optical glucose sensor and a camera. The monitor is the first of its kind, and the $8 billion-
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a-year market in diabetes management devices4 is optimistic about
the invention. There is, however, a problem: there is not a suitable
motion cancellation mechanism that would make the device’s readings sufficiently precise.5
Medical Devices, Inc. finds out about Small Inventor, Inc., whose
motion cancellation technology is the missing piece to the puzzle.
Medical Devices, Inc. is enthusiastic about acquiring the small inventor’s company and its technology for use in touchless glucose monitors.
Medical Devices, Inc. is unhappy when it learns of a cloud on
Small Inventor, Inc.’s license to its intellectual property (IP) assets.
When the inventor signed the licensing agreement, she agreed to a
standard clause6 stating that she could not assign the right to practice
the “troll’s” invention to anyone else. The “troll”, seeking to capitalize
on the profit potential of glucose monitors, wants to increase the royalties to 25% or, in the alternative, sue Medical Devices for patent
infringement if it proceeds with buying Small Inventor, Inc. The medical device company’s attorneys determined that, although the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) recently criticized the 25%
rule of thumb for setting royalties as improper,7 the holding did not
extend to private contracts. Furthermore, the attorneys find out that
the “troll” obtained a declaratory judgment8 stating that its client/server
patent was not invalid. Since invalidity is the main defense to claims
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tracking of temporal changes of reflected secondary speckles produced in the wrist when being
illuminated by a laser beam.”).
4. Mark D. Hughes, The Business of Self-Monitoring of Blood Glucose: A Market Profile,
3 J. DIABETES SCI. & TECH. 1219 (2009), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2769893/.
5. See Ozana, supra note 3, at 1926 (“Further development is needed such as motion
cancellation mechanism in order to [make the contactless glucose monitor] more robust.”).
6. Elaine D. Ziff & John G. Deming, IP Licenses: Restrictions on Assignment and Change
of Control, PRACTICAL L. PUBLICATION 1, 14 (2012) (licensor and licensee perspectives on assignability).
7. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“This court
now holds as a matter of Federal Circuit law that the 25 percent rule of thumb is a fundamentally
flawed tool for determining a baseline royalty rate in a hypothetical negotiation.”).
8. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201(a) (West 2010) (“In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare
the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or
not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a
final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.”); see, e.g., Windmoller v. Laguerre,
284 F. Supp. 563, 566 (D.D.C. 1968) (in a declaratory judgment action to determine validity of
patents, denying a motion to dismiss and noting that the action was consistent with the policy
underlying the Declaratory Judgment Act).
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B. Legal Question
The legal question addressed in the hypothetical supra is
whether corporate change-of-control transactions should limit the surviving entities’ ability to use newly acquired intellectual property, if
said property was previously licensed by the acquired business entity
from a third party that itself does not practice the licensed invention
(an NCE).
The answer to this question must be consistent with both contract
law and patent law. On one hand, contracts have been traditionally
presumed to be fully transferable, absent express provisions to the
35 U.S.C.A. § 282(b)(2) (West 2012).
See Kemmerer, supra note 2, at 7 (the average EBITDA profit margin is 18.6%).

12/28/2015 14:43:02

9.
10.
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of patent infringement,9 Medical Devices, Inc. is concerned that its
defense would not stand.
Medical Devices, Inc. anticipates to make a 20% profit margin10
and secure a 10% market share, which would make its annual profits
from the sale of touchless glucose monitoring devices $160 million
per year and would mean that the “troll” would receive $40 million, or
25% in royalties on profits. The “troll” is not willing to reassign the
license on the original terms, which include 11% royalties, because it
knows that it is likely to prevail at trial. Medical Devices, Inc. decides
that it would be significantly cheaper to develop the motion-control
technology in-house.
The corporate acquisition transaction does not go through. Small
Inventor, Inc. eventually goes out of business because people become less and less interested in pedometers, albeit exceptionally accurate ones. “Patent troll” makes nothing and does not get to sue
Medical Devices, Inc. for patent infringement because Medical Devices, Inc. does not acquire Small Inventor, Inc. or its technology and,
further, develops a design-around. Diabetic patients continue to draw
blood daily while Medical Devices, Inc. takes an additional three years
to develop and test a motion control technology for its contactless devices to get around a monopoly created by the “troll’s” patent.
The reason for this seemingly suboptimal outcome is the unassignability clause in the “troll’s” license to Small Inventor, Inc. This
Note presents an argument for relaxing these restraints on alienability
of patent licenses by invalidating such clauses when a patent is licensed from a non-creative entity (NCE or “patent troll”).
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contrary.11 On the other hand, courts have been reluctant to uphold
the assignability of intellectual property licenses to third parties because of a strong policy interest in encouraging patentees to retain
control of their inventions.12 However, the United States Supreme
Court (hereinafter, “SCOTUS”) has acknowledged that sometimes the
patent rights protection doctrine goes too far.13
This Note presents a synthesis of the principles of contract law,
intellectual property law, and antitrust policy in order to find a middleground approach. The proposal includes filling in the gaps in the body
of defenses to claims of patent infringement by supplementing the
doctrine of patent misuse, one such defense, to invalidate patent antiassignment clauses.
C. Roadmap to a Solution

12/28/2015 14:43:02

11. Cincom Sys., Inc. v. Novelis Corp., 581 F.3d 431, 437 (6th Cir. 2009) (“State contract
law will govern the interpretation of [an intellectual property] license because a license is merely
a type of contract.”).
12. Id.; see also In re CFLC, Inc., 89 F.3d 673, 679 (9th Cir. 1996) (federal law must govern
to prevent free assignability and to promote creativity); In re Alltech Plastics, Inc., 71 B.R. 686,
689 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1987) (“[Because the rights] of the patent owner to license the use of
his invention is [sic] a creature of federal common law . . . [i]t follows that questions regarding
the assignability of patent licenses are controlled by federal law.”) (internal citations omitted).
13. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126–27 (2006)
(citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8) (“[T]oo much patent protection can impede rather than
‘promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,’ the constitutional objective of patent and
copyright protection.”).

37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 190 Side B

Anti-assignability clauses in patent licenses, as restrictions on alienability, could lead to anti-competitive practices and are therefore
similar to practices prohibited by antitrust law. Problematically, however, there is no room in the traditional body of defenses to patent
infringement claims or, more generally, in patent law, to provide a
mechanism for evaluating and relaxing these restrictions even in the
face of suboptimal economic results. This Note proposes that this gap
in law can be resolved by grounding the argument for alienability of
patent licenses in the doctrine of patent misuse.
Part I discusses the economics of the issue, including the impact
of NCE activity on operating companies. Part I also presents an economics-based argument for judicially limiting downstream effects of
NCE licensing activity.
Part II introduces the legal background. Part II discusses the
courts’ efforts to curb NCE activities, which are demonstrative of the
courts’ readiness to consider alienability of licenses issued by NCEs.
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SCOTUS has recently taken steps to protect the industry from weak
patents asserted by NCEs by clarifying, for example, the requirements for patentable subject matter,14 indefiniteness,15 and claims of
induced infringement.16 A discussion and analysis, in Part II, of the
recent developments in the case law of patent litigation procedure
shows that the proposal presented here is consistent with these developments. SCOTUS efforts, however, have not addressed the problems faced by companies that choose to license patents from NCEs
rather than litigate against them. The recent changes in law also
wreaked havoc on the computer engineering patent field because the
patents invalidated by SCOTUS to curb NCE activity pertained mostly
to computer technologies.17
Part III presents an argument, rooted in antitrust and patent policy, that anti-assignment clauses in patent licenses from NCEs constitute patent misuse. The doctrine of patent misuse is reflected in the
Princo rule: to be considered misuse, a practice first must attempt to
unduly broaden the scope of a patent right, and second, it must be
linked to patents in suit.18
Part IV provides a roadmap for arguing alienability of patent licenses to business successors. First, Part IV reconciles the proposed
rule with case law. Second, Part IV addresses procedural aspects of
arguing license assignability, including timing, standing, and jurisdictional law.
Part V addresses counterarguments.
D. Intended Audience

12/28/2015 14:43:02

14. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
15. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014).
16. Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2118–19 (2014).
17. See Tristan Gray-Le Coz & Charles Duan, Apply it to the USPTO: Review of the Implementation of Alice v. CLS Bank in Patent Examination, 2014 PATENTLY-O PATENT L. J. 1,
http://patentlyo.com/media/2014/11/GrayLeCozDuan.pdf (USPTO withdrew over 800 applications from allowance following the Alice decision).
18. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1318–30 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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The topic explored in this Note is of interest to legal and economics scholars, legal practitioners in contract and patent law, and the
courts for several important reasons.
First, it is widely recognized that, in technology-intensive industries, intellectual property assets comprise a significant portion of a
company’s value. For instance, while in 1929 only a third of a typical
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19. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSETS IN MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS xxvii (Lanning Bryer &
Melvin Simensky eds,, 2002) [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSETS].
20. Id. at 12.15.
21. See, e.g., Elaine D. Ziff & Grace Del Val, IP Due Diligence Issues in M&A Transactions
Checklist, Practical Law Checklist 3-501-1681.
22. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSETS, supra note 19, at 12.15.
23. RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 79 (2013) (Judge Posner explains that
many large IT companies spend a significant amount on simply maintaining large patent portfolios for purely defensive purposes).
24. Id. at 76 (noting that the current patent system provides a disproportionate reward to
first-time inventors and through unnecessary complexity, expensive litigation and complex patent procurement rules discourages improvers from receiving protection for their inventions).
25. Intell. Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., No. 1:13-CV-00740 AJT, 2013 WL
6682981, at *1 (E.D. Va. Dec. 18, 2013).

37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 191 Side B

U.S. company’s assets were intangible assets, by 1990, the ratio of
intangible to tangible assets skyrocketed to approximately 63%, and
today more than 70% of U.S. growth comes from exploitation of intangible assets.19 It is therefore not surprising that there is currently a
significant interest in the practitioner community in developing best
practices for due diligence in corporate change-of-control transactions with respect to intellectual property licenses—after all, the target’s existing license agreements encumber the target’s use of the
subject intellectual property and could give rise to expenses in the
form of royalties20 and, at the extreme, to infringement lawsuits.21
Second, the bargaining power of licensors is often disproportionately high—in change-of-control transactions, licensors impose exorbitant fees of up to 100% of the original license fee if the intellectual
property at issue is valuable to the purchaser.22 This state of affairs is
particularly troublesome when the licensor accumulates patents
largely for monetary gain, which many argue is the case with noncreative entities.23
Third, there is a question of balancing existing law with policy
considerations while optimizing legal rules to help high technology
markets function efficiently. Although, as a society, we are prepared
to sustain certain transaction costs involved in procuring, licensing
and litigating patent rights if the end result is innovation that benefits
the public at large, such transaction costs become a threat to innovation when inefficiencies are exploited solely for the benefit of non-producers.24 Such exploitations result in uncertainty in IP portfolio
valuation, inhibit the operating capacity of inventors, and may leave
them in the dark as to the identity of their competitors.25 For example,
one court said, citing an accused infringer (in this case, Capital One
Financial Corporation) in a suit brought by an NCE:
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[S]hell companies conceal [the NCE’s] patents so that targets have
no idea that it is building walls of patents around their businesses’
and then when [the NCE] does launch its attack, its targets cannot
assess or value its portfolio and thus among other things cannot
determine whether they could avoid [the NCE’s] infringement
claims by redesigning their accused products or processes.26 (internal citations omitted)

This Note presents a comprehensive yet narrowly tailored rule to
address the problems outlined above.27
I. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
A. Non-Creative Entities and the Software and Electronics Industry
The proliferation of non-creative entities (NCEs) is considered by
some scholars and academics the most significant problem in the current U.S. patent system.28 NCEs acquire and enforce patents but typically do not practice them.29 Instead, they monitor the technological
advancements made by operating entities and keep their patents
alive through the USPTO30 application continuation process,31 mirroring, on paper, the real-world innovation.32 When it becomes apparent
that the real-world invention is about to realize commercial success,
a typical NCE tactic is to offer the operating entity to license the patent
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26. Id. at *1 (however, the NCE prevailed because the court noted that the respondent
failed to identify a patent in suit. Note that the court indicated, citing F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133
S. Ct. 2223, 2231 (2013), that increased licensing fees would not be allowed if they were not
entirely related to the patent in suit or if the patentee attempted to extend its power beyond the
term of the patent). See id. at 10.
27. A streamlined solution is much needed. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 23, at 90 (Judge
Posner points out that the current “patent doctrine . . . is such a tangle that even inventors
have great difficulty understanding it”).
28. Mark Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of Copying?, 105 MICH. L.
REV. 1525 (2007).
29. ROBERT P. MERGES, & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS
895 (LexisNexis, 6th ed., 2013).
30. U. S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, www.uspto.gov (a US government agency that
regulates patents and trademarks) (last modified Oct. 26, 2015).
31. U. S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 211
(9th ed. 2014), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s211.html [hereinafter MPEP] (procedure for claiming a benefit of an earlier filing date through divisional applications).
32. Lemley, supra note 28, at 2 (describing abuse by NCEs of continuation proceedings
available in USPTO patent prosecution practice and used by NCEs to enhance and supplement
existing patents).
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held by the NCE in exchange for avoiding claims of patent infringement.33
Information technology companies are particularly vulnerable to
NCE activity since a single patent on a component, which cannot be
easily replaced because of complex interfaces with other components, can give NCEs enormous leverage even when the value of the
patented technology itself is not very great.34 For example, one study
found that the most frequently litigated patents asserted in 2012-2014
by ten NCEs, which collectively brought infringement claims against
2,451 defendants, included those for geolocation, database, computer user interaction, and digital fingerprinting technologies.35
B. The Economic Case for Judicially Limiting Downstream Effects of NCE Licensing Activity
Companies often choose to license patents from NCEs, instead
of litigating, for two main reasons. First, the costs involved in defending a patent infringement suit are significant. For example, one study
found that infringement litigation cost small U.S. companies $11 billion in 2011.36 Second, losing in an infringement suit could lead to a
court-ordered injunction and company shutdown.37 When patented
technology is licensed from non-creative entities, such entities gain a
disproportionate amount of power in directing the licensee’s changeof-control decisions by enforcing non-assignability clauses in patent
licenses.
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 192 Side B
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33. Donald J. Chisum, Reforming Patent Law Reform, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP.
L. 336, 340 (2005).
34. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 29, at 895.
35. Colleen Chien, Patent Assertion and Startup Innovation, NEW AM. FOUND., OPEN TECH.
INST. 14 (Sept. 5, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2321340 (This study was commissioned by
the U.S. Congress as part of the America Invents Act of 2011, which sought to simplify the U.S.
patent system).
36. Jeremy Quittner, Supreme Court Deals Death Blow to Patent Trolls, INC (Feb. 28,
2015, 6:38 PM), http://www.inc.com/jeremy-quittner/supreme-court-ruling-on-patent-trolls.html
(“Small businesses mounted 3,400 legal defenses in 2011 for patent cases, a 32 percent increase over the prior year . . . . That cost to small companies was about $11 billion in 2011, also
a 32 percent increase over the prior year. The total median awards to trolls is now nearly twice
as high as those to legitimate patent holders, whose median reward fell about 30 percent to $4
billion, according to a 2013 report by PricewaterhouseCoopers.”) (internal citations omitted).
37. MICHAEL J. KASDAN ET AL., PRACTICAL LAW CO., PATENT INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS AND
DEFENSES
11
(2011),
http://www.arelaw.com/downloads/ARElaw_PatentInfringementClaimsDefenses.pdf. (“[T]he most powerful remedy available to a patent owner is a preliminary or permanent injunction that prevents the accused infringer from importing, making,
using, selling, offering for sale or importing into the US any product that infringes the patent.”).
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Since publicly available information does not include NCE licensing agreements, patent acquisition information, and cost and revenue
data, the full economic impact of NCE activity is unknown.38 However,
we do know that startup companies are attractive targets for non-creative entities because of these companies’ undercapitalization and
vulnerability.39 Moreover, startup companies are also attractive targets for merger and acquisition transactions (M&A) because of their
valuable niche technologies, and non-creative entities frequently initiate their patent assertion efforts when a startup is about to issue an
initial public offering or be acquired in an M&A transaction.40
A report commissioned by the U.S. Congress to study the impact
of patent litigation on the U.S. economy as part of the America Invents
Act of 2011 found that start-up companies are frequent targets for
non-creative entities.41 This is due to the prospect of quick monetary
gain from “nuisance” settlements and the precedential value of settlements that gives NCEs additional leverage in licensing negotiations
with larger companies.42 Approximately 75% of surveyed venture
capitalists and 20% of venture-backed startups with patent experience had been approached by non-creative entities, and approximately 80% of the time NCE demands included a licensing
arrangement for the startup’s own technology and 40% of the time an
adoption of NCE-patented technology.43
Startups with information technology- and electronics-based
products were NCE targets approximately 90% of the time.44 Even
with value-at-risk of under $1,000,000, the average cost of litigating a
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 193 Side A
12/28/2015 14:43:02

38. See Public Comment by Mark Bohannon, Red Hat, Inc., FED. TRADE COMM’N (Dec. 16,
2013, 1:19 PM), http://www.ftc.gov/policy/public-comments/comment-00043-17 (proposing to
send information requests to approximately 25 Patent Assertion Entities (“PAEs”), as well as to
approximately 15 other entities asserting patents in the wireless communications sector as part
of Project No. P131203). The author, who represents a company in the industry segment
strongly impacted by NCE activity, supports the proposed FTC study and notes that the agency
is uniquely positioned to collect this much needed information.
39. Eric Savitz, Are Patent Trolls Now Zeroed In on Start-Ups?, FORBES (Feb. 28, 2015,
6:45 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2013/01/17/are-patent-trolls-now-zeroed-inon-start-ups/.
40. Chien, supra note 35, at 11.
41. Id. at 31.
42. Id. (explaining nuisance value, (“[T]rolls know enough to peg [the] license fee just below [the] cost”) and the precedential value of settlements, (“[Patent holders] go after startup
companies to establish case precedent. Startups quickly agree to settle for a low amount because they have no money with which to stand up against an expensive legal battle. [The patent
holder] then attacks larger companies for money, using those previously established case precedents.”)).
43. Id. at 13.
44. Id.
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45. Savitz, supra note 39 (citing a Report of the Economic Survey published by the American Intellectual Property Law Association).
46. Chien, supra note 35, at 11–12, 17.
47. Conversant Takes Aim at Patent Troll Demand Letters, CONVERSANT (Feb. 28, 2015,
6:49 PM), http://www.conversantip.com/news-article/conversant-takes-aim-at-patent-troll-demand-letters/.
48. See generally Chien, supra note 35.
49. Catherine Tucker, The Effect of Patent Litigation and Patent Assertion Entities on Entrepreneurial Activity 31 (MIT Sloan School of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 5095-14, 2014),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2457611.
50. Ziff & Deming, supra note 6, at 9–10.
51. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSETS, supra note 19, at 4.12.
52. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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patent infringement lawsuit is $650,000.45 Because of the high cost of
litigation, and because pending patent litigation diminishes the value
of the entire company by as much as 20%, start-up companies
choose, at the rate of one in five companies, to settle with NCEs rather
than litigate with them.46
While the typical value of “nuisance” settlements and licensing
costs are relatively small—with various estimates placing the value of
licensing agreements at $1,000 to $50,00047 and the value of an average settlement agreement at $340,00048—the downstream effects
of these licensing arrangements are devastating. For example, one
likely effect of NCE activity is the loss of start-up funding. One study
estimates that NCE activity adds operating risk and thereby negatively impacts the U.S. economy by making venture capital unwilling
to invest in start-up companies, costing the U.S. economy between
$8.1 billion and $41.8 billion in venture capital losses over a five-year
period.49
Another problematic effect is a cloud on the start-up’s title to its
intellectual property assets. When a target’s technology is encumbered by a patent license, the first option a prospective purchaser of
the target is likely to pursue is licensor consent to assignment, a new
license, or a sub-license,50 which introduces significant additional licensing fees as a condition of the transaction. In licensing transactions, the licensor typically receives a significant royalty amount—
25% of the profit generated by the licensed invention.51 While the Federal Circuit recently noted that the 25% Rule is not always appropriate,52 the holding was limited to the calculation of damages and it is
not binding on private parties negotiating a licensing contract.
At the same time, as illustrated in the hypothetical case of Patent
troll v. Small Inventor, Inc. presented in the Introduction, NCEs are
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53. 35 U.S.C.A. § 284 (West 2012) (“Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award
the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than
a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer . . . .”) (emphasis added).
54. Juliet P. Kostritsky, Incomplete Contracts: Judicial Responses, Transactional Planning, and Litigation Strategies,, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 135, n.57 (2005) (“[T]he courts adopt
a damage measure that forces a breaching party to internalize the costs of its breach . . . . [This]
damage rule is efficient in the same way that strict liability rules in torts can be efficient: parties
can estimate for themselves when it is efficient to breach [and] the breacher will take into account the damage that a court would assess and compare that amount to the benefits from
breaching.”) (internal citations omitted).
55. This is inconsistent with the goal of promoting “Science and Useful Arts.” See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
56. Ziff & Deming, supra note 6, at 9.
57. Id.
58. Eric Eldon, CrunchBase Reveals: The Average Successful Startup Raises $25.3 Mil(Jan.
3,
2012),
lion,
Sells
For
$196.8
Million,
TECHCRUNCH
http://techcrunch.com/2012/01/03/crunchbaseexits/.
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unlikely to permit the licensees to transfer contracts to business successors if original royalty terms are significantly lower than what they
are reasonably likely to recover as infringement damages.53 Because
breaching the terms of the license and proceeding with the corporate
sale would force licensees or their successors to internalize the cost
of increased royalties, recoverable by NCEs in the form of damages,
the real-world effect of anti-assignability clauses in licenses is likely a
failure to execute the change of control or assent to an increase in
royalties.54 Each of these outcomes is sub-optimal—the former because the public is deprived of the benefit of accessing the patented
invention through the business successor,55 and the latter because it
represents a transfer of profits from an operating entity to a non-producer.
Yet another potential effect is a negative impact on the start-up’s
valuation. If the buyer is unable to reach an agreement with the licensor-NCE, the buyer will likely attempt to negotiate with the target a
price discount for the lost value of the licensed intellectual property.56
This, in turn, will negatively impact the valuation of the target company, and the resulting loss is likely to be disproportionately greater
than the cost of the initial licensing arrangement with the NCE. Other
than licensing, options that the buyer is likely to pursue include seeking indemnity for any patent infringement claims arising from the use
by the buyer of licensed patents or reimbursement of the buyer’s cost
of acquiring replacement intellectual property.57 Indemnification, not
surprisingly, adds costs.
An average successful start-up sells for approximately $196.8
million.58 Combined with expected valuation loss of 20% if a patent
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59. Ziff & Deming, supra note 6, at 2 (“[W]here an IP license is silent on assignability by
the licensee, the majority of courts have found that a licensee’s rights are presumed not assignable without the licensor’s express consent.”).
60. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709,
717–18 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Mayer, J. concurring) (“Unless we are to assume that the constraints
explicit in the Intellectual Property Clause are mere surplusage, we are bound to ensure that
the patent monopoly serves ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . . This is
the standard expressed in the Constitution and it may not be ignored.’”) (citing Graham v. John
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)) (internal citations omitted).
61. Ultramercial, Inc., 772 F.3d 709 at 718 (“[T]he primary purpose of the patent system is
to promote scientific progress, not to creat[e] . . . private fortunes for the owners of patents.”)
(citing Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917)) (internal
citations omitted).
62. 35 U.S.C.A. § 112 (West 2012).
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infringement lawsuit is pending, the cost of the initial “nuisance” licensing settlement with the NCE will now increase to up to $40 million— either because negotiations will position an average licensorNCE to demand up to $40 million, or 20% of the target’s valuation, in
licensing fees from the purchasing company, or because the target
will be expected to absorb up to this amount through indemnification
and litigation cost-sharing with the buyer.
Problematically, even in the absence of an explicit non-assignment clause in a patent license between the NCE and the original
licensor, intellectual property transfer is considered an asset sale in
the context of corporate restructuring transactions, and, as such, the
purchaser remains vulnerable to claims of infringement if a corporate
transfer occurs by operation of law.59 In other words, it is nearly impossible to circumvent a typical anti-assignment clause in a patent
license.
It is unlikely that the judiciary contemplated such extreme results
when the body of law that made licenses non-assignable was developed. It is likewise improbable that the drafters of the Patent Clause
in the U.S. Constitution60 contemplated rewarding non-producing patent holders to this extent.61 In fact, many patents are simply ahead of
their time, and the relaxed constructive enablement standard, which
allows applicants to receive patents by explaining how an invention
would work rather than producing a functioning model, was created
to account for this possibility.62
It is, however, unlikely that the promulgators of the constructive
enablement standard envisioned that an NCE would procure a patent
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on a pre-populated drop-down box before interactive computing devices become feasible and then bring infringement actions against
operating entities using this common technology.63
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Filling the Gaps in Traditional Defenses to Claims of Patent
Infringement
Non-creative entities typically bring claims of patent infringement,
and relaxing the rules for license alienability would therefore shield
licensors and their successors from such claims.
Patent infringement is a statutorily defined concept.64 The United
States Code recognizes three primary categories of patent infringement: direct infringement, induced infringement, and contributory infringement.65 The concept of direct infringement is codified in 35
U.S.C. § 271(a) and makes it unlawful to make, use, offer for sale or
sell another’s patented invention.66 The doctrine of induced infringement is codified in 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) and prohibits actions that “actively induce[] infringement of a patent”67 when the accused infringer
knows that a patent exists. Contributory infringement, codified in 35
U.S.C. § 271(c), makes it unlawful to import, sell, or offer for sale a
component that constitutes a material part of a patented invention.68
Both contributory and induced infringements require proof of direct
infringement and impose an additional scienter requirement on the
accused infringer.69
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 195 Side A
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63. Soverain Software LLC v. Newegg, Inc., 705 F.3d 1333, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2013), aff’d,
728 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“We conclude that the prior art . . . by clear and convincing
evidence, rendered obvious the ‘shopping cart’ claims.”), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 910 (2014);
see also Daniel Nazer, Bad News for Patent Trolls! FTC to Look Under the Hood of the TrollFRONTIER
FOUND.
(Feb.
28,
2015,
6:49
PM),
mobile,
ELEC.
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/06/bad-news-patent-trolls-ftc-look-under-hood-trollmobile
(noting that a Federal Trade Commission spokesperson used this case as an example of frivolous patent enforcement when FTC announced an investigation into the conduct of “patent
trolls”).
64. 35 U.S.C.A. § 271 (West 2010).
65. Id.
66. 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(a) (West 2010).
67. 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(b) (West 2010).
68. 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(c) (West 2010).
69. Plastering Dev. Ctr., Inc. v. Perma Glas-Mesh Corp., 371 F. Supp. 939, 949 (N.D. Ohio
1973) (discussing Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961) and
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476 (1964)) (“The fundamental
basis of patent law requires that a patent holder establish acts of direct infringement before
liability for inducement or contributory infringement can be found.”).
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70. KASDAN, supra note 37, at 5.
71. 35 U.S.C.A. § 282(b)(1) (West 2012).
72. KASDAN, supra note 37, at 5.
73. 35 U.S.C.A. § 282(b)(2) (West 2012).
74. 35 U.S.C.A. § 112 (West 2012).
75. 35 U.S.C.A. § 102 (West 2015).
76. 35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (West 2015).
77. KASDAN, supra note 37, at 5–7.
78. See, e.g., Soverain Software LLC v. Newegg, Inc., 705 F.3d 1333, 1341 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (citing the “clear and convincing evidence” standard).
79. Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elec. Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008) (“The longstanding
doctrine of patent exhaustion provides that the initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that item.”); see also KASDAN, supra note 37, at 6.
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Traditional defenses to claims of patent infringement can be
broadly grouped into three categories. The first category is simple
non-infringement—that is, the accused infringer establishes that its
actions do not meet the elements of patent infringement.70 This statutorily codified category of defenses includes non-infringement, absence of liability for infringement, and unenforceability.71 This Note
proposes linking license alienability, via a doctrine of patent misuse,
to this category of defenses—specifically, to unenforceability—because the unenforceability defense, if sustained, does not invalidate
the underlying patent. This is, advantageously, a narrowly tailored solution.
The second, frequently litigated, category of defenses challenges
patent validity in view of statutory requirements for patentability.72
Likewise, this category is statutorily codified73 and includes failure to
meet the statutory requirements of patentability on the grounds of indefiniteness,74 anticipation75 and obviousness76 of patented subject
matter in light of prior art consisting largely of patents previously issued to the patent-holder and any third parties.77
This doctrinal body of defenses is predicated on the concept that
a patent cannot be infringed if it is invalid, and the burden is on the
defendant to establish patent invalidity.78 As discussed in Part II infra,
relying on patent invalidity to defend against claims of patent infringement is problematic because, unlike the enforceability-based solution
introduced here, invalidity-based defenses result in court holdings
that generate substantive and procedural uncertainty.
The third category of defenses includes equitable defenses, such
as inequitable conduct in the process of procuring a patent, patent
exhaustion, laches, and equitable estoppel.79
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The doctrine of patent exhaustion is of particular interest in the
context of NCE activity. Patent exhaustion negates infringement if the
accused infringer shows that it has an express or implied license from
the patentee to practice the invention.80 Equitable defenses illustrate
the need for relaxing the rules for alienability of patent licenses. For
example, under the doctrine of patent exhaustion, the patentee loses
the ability to block others from using its invention after it places the
patented article in the stream of commerce.81 This makes the operating entity-patentee unable to take advantage of the entire economic
value chain82 and precludes recovery when, for example, purchasers
refurbish and competitively resell the patented product.83
Thus, entities that practice their patents by making products lose
the right to control their inventions as soon as patented articles are
sold. On the other hand, NCEs, who do not themselves produce any
articles based on their patents and therefore commercialize patents
by licensing them rather than selling manufactured patented articles,
control their patents long after these are licensed. This inequity is yet
another reason for relaxing the rules for alienability of NCE licenses,
at a minimum to the licensee-operating entity’s business successors.
B. Why the Courts Are Ready to Look at NCE Contracts—a
Historical Progression of Anti-NCE Litigation
1. Patent Infringement Litigation

12/28/2015 14:43:02

80. Id.
81. Quanta Comput. Inc., 553 U.S. at 633–35 (patent rights to products that “constitute a
material part of the patented invention” are exhausted when such products are sold).
82. Timothy J. Sturgeon & Momoko Kawakami, Global Value Chains in the Electronics
Industry 3 (The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 5417, 2014),
http://secnet087.un.org/unsd/trade/s_geneva2011/refdocs/RDs/GVC%20in%20Electronics%20Industry%20(Sturgeon%20-%20Sep%202010).pdf
(“Intermediate electronics and automotive goods dominate total trade in the top-50 manufactured intermediate products.” In other words, the electronics industry relies on modular financing, where a component may become more valuable when combined with other components in
a finished product).
83. LG Elecs., Inc. v. Hitachi, Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1045–46 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
84. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
85. Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014).
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The U.S. Supreme Court recently issued a number of decisions
intended to limit the impact of NCE activity. SCOTUS, in developing
its body of precedential case law, has focused, in succession, on limiting the remedies available to NCEs,84 refining the rules on whether
and when NCE patents are infringed,85 and determining whether NCE
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patents are valid.86 Additionally, lower courts limited the binding
power of contracts in technology licensing.87 It is clear that the courts
are now well-positioned to consider a logical extension to this body of
law by developing rules for invalidating anti-assignment clauses in
NCE licensing contracts.
SCOTUS first tackled remedies. In eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C., SCOTUS, following a finding of patent infringement, denied
the plaintiff a permanent injunction because the suit arose from a noncompetitor.88 The Court affirmed that the purpose of the Patent Act
was to protect innovation by excluding others from infringing,89 but
employed a policy-based analysis to conclude that the status of the
parties as competitors is dispositive on the issue of whether injunctions can be granted.90 The Court grounded its decision in an equitybased four-factor test to determine when an injunction is appropriate91
and indicated that it saw no public policy benefit in putting an accused
infringer out of business and, by doing so, granting NCEs additional
leverage to negotiate favorable licensing terms.92
Notably, SCOTUS held that the status of parties as non-competitors is key to restricting availability of injunctive relief to NCEs. Forcing the accused party to shut down operations in response to a suit
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86. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014); Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd.
v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
87. See infra notes 128–30; see generally A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: SOFTWARE
CONTRACTS 44 (2010) (noting that clauses that constitute IP misuse should be unenforceable).
88. eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 396–97 (Kennedy, J., Stevens, J., Souter, J., and Breyer, J.,
concurring) (“When the patented invention is but a small component of the product the companies seek to produce and the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in
negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement and an
injunction may not serve the public interest.”).
89. See id. at 396 (J. Kennedy, J. Stevens, J. Souter, J. Breyer concurring) (“In cases now
arising trial courts should bear in mind that in many instances the nature of the patent being
enforced and the economic function of the patent holder present considerations quite unlike
earlier cases. An industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing
and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees. . . . For these firms, an
injunction, and the potentially serious sanctions arising from its violation, can be employed as a
bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the
patent.”)
90. See id. at 391 (majority opinion) (“According to well-established principles of equity, a
plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant
such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that
remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that
injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent
injunction.”)
91. Id.
92. Id. at 397 (Kennedy, J., Stevens, J., Souter, J., and Breyer, J., concurring).
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from an NCE arguably yields a loss to the economy without a corresponding benefit.93 The proposal, advanced in this Note, to relax the
rules of alienability of licenses from NCEs to the licensor’s business
successors is premised on the same principle.
In further attempts to limit the fallout from NCE activity in the information technology industry, SCOTUS tightened the standard for
determining whether infringement occurred, making it more difficult
for NCEs to prevail in infringement suits. For example, in Limelight
Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc., the Court held that proof
of induced infringement first required proof of direct infringement.94
The effect of this decision is a heightened standard for establishing
induced infringement, and this effect is of particular significance to
information technology patents, where method claims, comprising
discrete steps, are frequently used to define patented subject matter.95 Under the standard upheld by SCOTUS, to establish infringement, it is necessary for the moving party to show that a single
infringing actor had performed all the steps.96 The holding helped assure peace of mind for technology companies that would otherwise
be vulnerable to infringement suits because the technologies they
make are highly interactive and many steps that take place as a matter of practicing these inventions are carried out by end users.97
In their brief supporting the petitioner, key actors in the information technology industry warned the Supreme Court that modifying
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93. See id. at 396 (“In cases now arising trial courts should bear in mind that in many
instances the nature of the patent being enforced and the economic function of the patent holder
present considerations quite unlike earlier cases. An industry has developed in which firms use
patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees. . . . For these firms, an injunction, and the potentially serious sanctions arising
from its violation, can be employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies
that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent.”).
94. Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014).
95. 35 U.S.C.A. § 100(b) (West 2015) (“The term “process” means process, art, or method,
and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or
material.”).
96. Limelight Networks, Inc., 134 S.Ct. at 2117.(“[A] method’s steps have not all been performed as claimed by the patent unless they are all attributable to the same defendant, either
because the defendant actually performed those steps or because he directed or controlled
others who performed them.”).
97. Kimberly Atkins, Supreme Court Rulings Could Create Issues for Patent Trolls, NEW
ENGLAND IN-HOUSE, http://newenglandinhouse.com/2014/07/15/supreme-court-rulings-couldcreate-issues-for-patent-trolls/#ixzz3KOrL3E4D (last visited Aug. 2, 2015) (“If [the lower court,
to which the case was remanded] upholds the single-actor standard, it will be good news for
software companies like Microsoft, one of many amici that filed briefs in the case. Those briefs
expressed concern that under a different standard, companies could face infringement suits
even if they were unaware of customer actions that could be seen as implementing certain steps
in a competitor’s patent process.”).
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the single-actor standard would increase both uncertainty and complexity in discovery and would thus encourage abusive infringement
litigation and force the settlement of even non-meritorious claims.98
SCOTUS clearly agreed with this argument when it held for the petitioner.
The Supreme Court, during the 2014 term, also attempted to clarify the standards of patentability and made it easier for accused infringers to challenge NCE infringement claims by advancing a
defense of patent invalidity. For instance, in Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig
Instruments, Inc., SCOTUS clarified the standard of definiteness in
claim language,99 and in Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, SCOTUS
took steps to limit the subject matter that is eligible for patenting.100
While the Supreme Court should be commended for its efforts to
limit NCE activity, the body of precedential law illustrated by its recent
decisions is not yet complete. Under eBay, NCEs can still seek monetary damages. Under Limelight, pharmaceutical companies, another
industry that drives innovation, are left unable to bring valid claims of
infringement against copycats who change the drug delivery mechanism by splitting the practice of the invention between the manufacturer and the end user. Finally, the Nautilus and Alice decisions have
been welcomed in the information technology sector but they still require accused infringers to put up an expensive defense. Todd Moore,
a member of the Application Developers Alliance and CEO and
Founder of TMSOFT, an application publisher for mobile devices,
commented on the Alice decision: “This ruling is definitely a win and I
hope the USPTO will stop issuing patents on abstract ideas. But what
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 197 Side B
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98. Brief for Google, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Limelight Networks,
Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111 (Mar. 3, 2014) (No. 12-786), at 16 (“Far-reaching
discovery into the geographically, temporally, and functionally disparate operation of unrelated
suppliers of complementary goods and services will provoke settlements driven by cost rather
than the merits of the parties’ claims.”).
99. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014) (“[W]e read §
112, ¶ 2 to require that a patent’s claims, viewed in light of the specification and prosecution
history, inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.
The definiteness requirement, so understood, mandates clarity, while recognizing that absolute
precision is unattainable.”).
100. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2356 (2014) (holding that the
concept of intermediated transaction settlement embodied by the patented system is an abstract
idea and is therefore unpatentable).
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about the thousands that were already issued? It’s too expensive to
let companies fight every bad patent out there.”101
Indeed, litigating bad patents is expensive because a USPTOissued patent is presumed valid,102 and a successful invalidity defense requires proof “by clear and convincing evidence.”103 The solution proposed in this Note avoids problems associated with high costs
of litigating patents because the argument for alienability of patent licenses issued by NCEs is tailored precisely to avoid the litigating issue of patent validity.

2.ProblemswithInvalidityǦBasedDefensestoClaimsofInǦ
fringement

12/28/2015 14:43:02

101. U.S. Supreme Court Software Patent Decision: What Alliance Members Are Saying,
APPLICATION DEVELOPERS ALL. (June 20, 2014), https://www.appdevelopersalliance.org/news/2014/6/20/us-supreme-court-software-patent-decision-what-apps-alliancemembers-are-saying.
102. 35 U.S.C.A. § 282(a) (West 2012).
103. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship., 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2246 (2011).
104. Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2353.
105. Gray-Le Coz & Duan, supra note 17 (assignees with the most withdrawals of allowances included technology and financial services giants IBM, Microsoft, eBay, IGT, and JPMorgan Chase Bank).
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Two main problems with the recent judicial trend of invalidating
patents to dispose of claims of infringement are substantive and procedural uncertainty. The proposal advanced in this Note avoids these
problems because it focuses on patent unenforceability as to the licensee or its successor rather than invalidity.
As to substantive uncertainty, an adverse effect of Nautilus, Alice
and their progeny is the uncertainty they have introduced by changing
the rules of patentability. In Alice, for example, SCOTUS held that the
concept of intermediated transaction settlement embodied by a patented computer system was an abstract idea and is therefore unpatentable in the absence of factors that would amount to
“significantly more” than a mere idea.104 The holding allowed an accused infringer to prevail over an NCE’s claim of patent infringement
by arguing that the NCE’s patent was invalid.
On the flipside, the holding drastically impacted patentability of
software inventions, especially in the financial services industry.
Within two months of the Alice decision, USPTO withdrew 830 previously granted patents from allowance105 even though these patents
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106. 35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (West 2015).
107. Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344,1347 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
108. Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, 576 F. App’x 1005, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
109. buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
110. See, e.g., SiRF Tech v. ITC, 601 F.3d 1319, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (a method for calculating an absolute position of a GPS receiver).
111. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing CyberSource
Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
112. DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
113. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996) (“We hold that the
construction of a patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within the province
of the court.”).

37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 198 Side B

were directed to processes, which is a statutorily patentable category.106 CAFC followed Alice by invalidating patents directed to image
data processing and correlation,107 algorithm processing in online
gaming,108 and online transaction processing.109 Prior to Alice, similar
technologies were found patent-eligible.110
The Alice rule did not provide a clear standard for evaluating patent-eligibility of software and online technologies. Following the Alice
decision, patent claims directed to online advertising technologies
were invalidated in Ultramercial v. Hulu, LLC in part because they
contained “insignificant data gathering steps”,111 yet similar claims
were upheld in DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P. because the
abstract idea was not easily identifiable from the patent claim at issue.112 Post-Alice, the strength of patents directed to computer technologies appears to rest not in the inventive value of the patented
systems, but rather in the patent drafter’s skill to avoid describing the
systems as abstract ideas. Arguably, the Alice approach to patent invalidity results in a high degree of uncertainty in the industry because
numerous patents drafted and issued pre-Alice may be found ineligible.
Another problem with Alice-like defenses to infringement, which
are based on patent invalidity, is procedural uncertainty. Findings of
invalidity require the court to construe patent claims to determine the
scope of the patented invention.113 However, courts, sympathetic to
accused infringers, recently introduced procedural shortcuts aimed at
avoiding the question of patent validity, including modification of the
evidentiary standard and issuing decisions of invalidity without formal
claim construction hearings.
For example, in Bose Corp. v. SDI Tech., CAFC held that a summary judgment of non-infringement was appropriate if the accused
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infringer relied in good faith on counsel’s opinion114 that the opposing
party’s patent was invalid.115 Similarly, in Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco
Sys., Inc.,116 CAFC disposed with the “clear and convincing evidence”
requirement to prove invalidity by using the accused infringer’s goodfaith belief that the patent was invalid as a basis for a finding of no
infringement liability.117 As a result, the “clear and convincing evidence” standard is now grounded in the accused infringer’s subjective
belief118 rather than in invalidity of a patent in light of its claims.119
Finally, courts have increasingly relied on USPTO grant of inter
partes reviews, which USPTO grants when “there is a reasonable
likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least [one]
of the claims challenged in the petition,”120 as evidence of good-faith
belief that the accuser’s patent is invalid. However, this is not a good
proxy because USPTO grants such review more often than not and
because a mere likelihood of invalidity may not translate to a finding
of invalidity at trial. USPTO appears to recognize this as a problem
because the number of inter partes review petitions that have been
denied has been steadily increasing: in FY 2013, 13% of such petitions were denied; in 2014, this number increased to 25%, and in FY
2015, it further increased to 29%.121
Another recent decision indicative of procedural uncertainty is
CAFC’s finding of patent invalidity in Ultramercial v. Hulu, LLC122 discussed supra. The court, in reviewing a district court’s dismissal for
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114. Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389–90 (Fed.
Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds by In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir.
2007)) (accused infringer has a “duty to seek and obtain competent legal advice from counsel
before the initiation of any possible infringing activity”).
115. Bose Corp. v. SDI Techs., Inc., 558 Fed. App’x. 1012, 1024 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
116. Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 720 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2013), reh’g denied
(Oct. 25, 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 704 (2014) and cert. granted in part, 135 S. Ct. 752
(2014).
117. Brief of Biotechnology Industry Organization as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 2015 WL 394343 (2015) (No. 13-896), at 14 (“By permitting an inducer to avoid liability by virtue of a good-faith belief of invalidity, the Federal Circuit
provides a pathway by which one accused of inducement may effectively assert an invalidity
defense that runs up against no presumption of validity, and that can be established on evidence
that is less than ‘clear and convincing.’ As demonstrated by the facts of this case, an inducer
may avoid liability by a mistaken belief of invalidity. So long as it is held in good faith, the inducer’s invalidity defense can be entirely meritless.”) (internal citations omitted).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 35 U.S.C.A. § 314(a) (West 2012).
121. U. S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD STATISTICS
(2015), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2015-06-30%20PTAB.pdf.
122. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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failure to state a claim, issued a holding that an NCE’s patent was
invalid123 in the absence of a claim construction hearing.124 In 1996,
SCOTUS, in Markman, held that claim construction is a question of
law, and, following this decision, Markman hearings, or proceedings
solely limited to determining the scope of patent claims at issue and
distinct from proceedings on infringement, became common practice.
Markman hearings125 provide an opportunity for both sides to introduce technical experts and evidence to aid in claim construction126 on
“case dispositive” claim terms.127
The decisions discussed above represent impressive judicial efforts to limit NCE activity.128 The resulting procedural uncertainty,
however, is a significant drawback of relying on patent invalidity to
challenge infringement claims because it renders legal analysis imprecise, as in Commill, and makes the judicial decision-making process less transparent, as in Ultramercial. This, although reducing the
cost of litigation, may diminish the value of patents for the industry.
On the other hand, addressing the relationship between NCEs and
accused infringers in the context of their contractual relationship without viewing such relationships through the lens of the NCE patent
would avoid these problems.
3. Patent Licensing Litigation

12/28/2015 14:43:02

123. Id. at 714.
124. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996) (holding that
claim construction is a question of law).
125. John D. Love, U.S. Magistrate Judge, U. S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Tex., Standing
Order Regarding Letter Brief and Briefing Procedures for Early Markman Hearing/Summary
Judgment of Non-Infringement Requests (Jan. 9, 2012) [hereinafter Standing Order],
http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin2/view_document.cgi?document=21674.
126. En Liung Huang v. Auto Shade, Inc., 945 F.Supp. 1307, 1308 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (“Expert
testimony upon this question is both permissible and appropriate if the court finds it to be of
assistance in reaching its determination of the meaning of the language of the patent.”) (citing
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996), aff’g, 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir.
1995)).
127. See Standing Order, supra note 125 (limiting claim construction requests to no more
than three “case dispositive” terms).
128. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 718 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (J. Mayer citing
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511) (1917) (explaining
that “the primary purpose” of the patent system is to promote scientific progress, not to
“creat[e] . . . private fortunes for the owners of patents.”) (emphasis added).
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When courts make it easier to legally challenge and wholly or
partially invalidate licensing agreements, NCEs lose incentives to enter into these contracts. As such, promoting license alienability will
help accomplish several important objectives. First, the problem of
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129. Rates Tech., Inc. v. Speakeasy, Inc., 685 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S.
Ct. 932, 184 (2013); but see Indus. Eng’g & Dev., Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., No.
8:12-CV-691-T-24-MAP, 2014 WL 4206584 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2014) (holding that a no-challenge clause was enforceable; however, note that here at issue was a claim for breach of a
cross-licensing agreement).
130. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 583 F.3d
832 (Fed. Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011); Preston v. Marathon Oil Co., 684 F.3d 1276
(Fed. Cir. 2012).
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existing bad patents will cease to exist because the parties will be
able to challenge the license agreement rather than patent validity.
This, in turn, will promote certainty and stability within the patent system. Second, the costs of litigation and the burdens on the court system will significantly diminish. Furthermore, companies that purchase
intellectual property assets where the title is encumbered by a license
with an NCE will be less likely to infringe and will therefore not be
subject to monetary damages. This, in turn, will strengthen their negotiating position with NCEs.
Courts have already successfully undertaken the task of invalidating some aspects of intellectual property licensing contracts by, for
example, disfavoring non-producers when defining succession rights
to IP assets in bankruptcy proceedings and by limiting the doctrine of
licensee estoppel. Licensee estoppel disfavors operating entities in
comparison to NCEs by limiting the reach of patents held by operating
entities to the products they sell.
In Rates Tech., Inc. v. Speakeasy, Inc., the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that a no-challenge
clause in a settlement agreement is unenforceable if settlement occurs before litigation.129 In Stanford v. Roche and Preston v. Marathon
Oil Co., CAFC held that a contract presently assigning future inventions takes precedence over a contract promising to assign such
rights in the future.130 These holdings granted more control over the
patented subject matter to the inventor and its business successor,
thus diminishing the amount of power given to intermediaries, such
as the “patent troll” introduced in the beginning of this Note, who do
not contribute to the creative process.
Another important development, aimed at discouraging licensing
attempts by NCEs, is the recent trend in judicially limiting the power
of patent holders to argue licensee estoppel to foreclose the other
party from advancing infringement defenses.
NCEs routinely threaten infringement litigation to coerce operating entities to license because patent invalidity is one of the primary
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131. Ronald A. Bleeker & Michael V. O’Shaughnessy, One Year After Medimmune-the Impact on Patent Licensing & Negotiation, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 401, 402 (2008).
132. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 664 (1969).
133. See Bleeker & O’Shaughnessy, supra note 131 (“[T]he Federal Circuit has repeatedly
narrowed and limited the ruling’s scope. For example, subsequent decisions held that Lear only
applied to patent license agreements and not to patent assignment agreements or to consent
judgments in patent cases. In addition, the courts held that Lear did not apply to litigation settlement agreements.”).
134. Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2004), abrogated by
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
135. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 135 (2007) (“Promising to pay
royalties on patents that have not been held invalid does not amount to a promise not to seek a
holding of their invalidity.”).
136. PATENT REFORM AS IT APPLIES TO NON-PRACTICING ENTITY PATENT LITIGATION, AM. BAR
ASSOC.,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/intellectual_property_law/archive/2012/patentreform-as-itapplies.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Aug. 29, 2015)
(“After MedImmune, patent trolls are less likely to aggressively pursue licensing under the idea
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defenses to claims of patent infringement, and the doctrine of licensee
estoppel prevents licensees of patents from challenging patent validity.131 The Supreme Court attempted to optimize this legal rule in Lear,
Inc. v. Adkins, noting that the interest in protecting property rights
granted by a patent must be balanced against the need to remove
invalid patents from the patent system so that only valuable inventions
are protected.132 The lower courts subsequently narrowed the Lear
doctrine when they held it to be inapplicable to patent assignment
agreements, consent judgments, and litigation settlement agreements.133 The lower courts also held that, in order to bring an action
seeking a declaratory judgment of patent invalidity, the licensee first
had to repudiate the licensing agreement by, for example, failing to
pay royalties.134
Lower court decisions were favorable to patent-holders, including
NCEs. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the trend of limiting
the Lear doctrine when, in 2007, the Court relaxed the standing requirements in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. and held that patent licensees did not need to repudiate or breach a licensing
agreement in order to challenge the validity of the licensed patent.135
SCOTUS thus demonstrated that it was ready to carve out an exception to the doctrine of licensee estoppel by disallowing licensors to
seek immunity from patent validity challenges when they enter licensing agreements. NCEs could no longer enter licensing agreements to
shield themselves from litigation by licensees.
The MedImmune decision discouraged NCEs from aggressively
pursuing patent licensing.136 In an apparent effort to further discourage NCEs from attempting to collect licensing fees on possibly weak
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patents, CAFC extended the Medimmune holding in SanDisk Corp. v.
STMicroelectronics, Inc. when it held that protracted licensing negotiations gave the prospective licensee the necessary standing to challenge the underlying patent’s validity without even having to enter a
licensing agreement with an NCE.137 A similar effort was undertaken
by USPTO when it introduced inter partes proceedings where any
party may challenge a patent.138
In summary, it is apparent that, first, courts did not favor nonproducers in their recent decisions; second, courts wanted to give licensee operating entities more freedom to seek legal redress against
NCE tactics; and third, courts signaled that taking licenses from NCEs
does not completely extinguish the rights of operating entities. It is
logical for the courts to now focus on developing a principled approach to determining when anti-assignment clauses in intellectual
property licensing agreements are invalid.
III. LEGAL THEORY

12/28/2015 14:43:02

that once they lock up the license, the licensee can’t challenge the patent’s validity. This takes
some of the pressure off companies to investigate the validity before entering the contract, but
licensors can still use provisions such as upfront license payment, forum selection clauses,
licensor’s right to attorney’s fees from a successful defense of the patent.”).
137. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that prospective licensee had standing to challenge the patent because “[the patent holder]
has engaged in a course of conduct that shows a preparedness and willingness to enforce its
patent” even in the absence of a direct threat to sue the prospective licensee for patent infringement).
138. MPEP, supra note 31, at § 2609 (“Any third party requester can request inter partes
reexamination at any time during the period of enforceability of the patent . . . .”).
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This Note proposes extending one of the traditionally available
defenses to claims of patent infringement, the doctrine of patent misuse, to facilitate acquisition by a third-party of technology licensed
from NCEs. The proposed mechanism for expanding this doctrine is
a rule for invalidating anti-assignment provisions and covenants not
to sell, which are typically present in intellectual property licensing
agreements. The proposed rule addresses scenarios where, in a corporate restructuring (for example, M&A) transaction, the target’s assets are encumbered by such licensing agreements. A synthesis of
the concepts of patent unenforceability, patent misuse, and antitrust
policy is used to arrive at the proposed analytical result.
The following sections will present the proposed rule and discuss
a policy-based approach for reconciling the legal frameworks of pa-
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tent, contract, and antitrust to the extent these theories inform the proposal for upholding alienability of patent licenses under the doctrine
of patent misuse.
A. Summary of the Proposed Rule

Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1318–34.
Id. at 1329.
Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979).
See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
Karen E. Sandrik, Formal but Forgiving: A New Approach to Patent Assignments, 66
RUTGERS L. REV. 299, 305 (2014).

12/28/2015 14:43:02
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As stated in Princo v. Int’l Trade Comm.,139 patent misuse is an
attempt to unduly extend the scope of the patent right in a manner
that has anti-competitive effects and in the presence of a clearly identifiable patent at issue.140 Mere “misuse in the air” is not sufficient.141
The rule proposed here supplements the Princo rule. The proposed rule can be summarized as follows: first, refusal by NCEpatentees to assign licenses to the licensee’s business successors
on the same terms constitutes patent misuse in light of the Princo rule
because NCE licensing activity is an attempt to unduly extent the
scope of a patent; and, second, case law establishes that patent misuse renders the underlying patent unenforceable as to the licensee or
its business successor. As illustrated below, each analytical step in
the proposed rule is informed by policy considerations and case law.
The proposed rule solves several problems. The rule focuses on
patent unenforceability, providing a narrowly tailored solution. It is
consistent with the principle, found in patent law, of avoiding disruptions to limited-term monopolies secured by patents142 because the
NCE is free to continue to receive royalties from the licensee’s business successor. Also, the proposed rule is consistent with freedom of
contract143 because the underlying contract is not invalidated and because the proposed rule supplements rather than overrides contract
interpretation principles and applies only to federally adjudicated issues of patent licenses.144 Finally, the rule is mindful of the distinction
between productive and non-productive entities insofar as such distinction relates to their competitor status, which is a principle rooted
in antitrust policy.
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B. The Princo Rule as a Starting Point

C. Policy Considerations to Supplement the Princo Rule Analysis
1. Patent

12/28/2015 14:43:02

In order to develop a viable solution to the problem of unduly restrictive licensing agreements, it is necessary to understand the policy
objectives that underlie patent law. The doctrine of patent law is primarily concerned with, first, stimulating innovation; second, rewarding
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Patent misuse is an attempt to unduly extend the scope of the
patent right in a manner that has anti-competitive effects and in the
presence of a clearly identifiable patent at issue. Mere “misuse in the
air” is not sufficient. We adopt this rule because it provides a clear
roadmap and illuminates critical analytical components of interest with
respect to NCE licensing activity: effect on the reach of the patent
monopoly, non-producer status of NCEs, and focus on NCE activity
after such entities procure patents.
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145. Aronson, 440 U.S. at 262.
146. Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730 (1998)
(arguing that a right to exclude is a sine qua non in property law).
147. JOSEPH W. SINGER ET AL., PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 39
(Wolters Kluwer 6th ed. 2014) (legal rights as jural relations among people); Gregory S. Alexander, Property as a Fundamental Constitutional Right? The German Example, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 733, 748 (2003) (discussing the “social obligation” of ownership in German jurisprudence).
148. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 29, at 627, n. 2.
149. 1 MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 1:38 (4th ed.).
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invention; and third, assuring that innovative ideas do not remain indefinitely in the private domain.145
Our proposal does not disrupt these objectives. Promoting alienability of patent licenses from licensee-operating entities to their business successors is consistent with the principles of patent law. The
principle of discouraging patentees from retaining a long-time monopoly on their invention is not disrupted because, when a license is
transferred to a business successor, such successor should be able
to assume the original licensee’s contractual obligations to the NCE.
Furthermore, invention is still rewarded because the NCE retains
the ability to maintain its royalty stream from the business successor,
but on the same terms as those of the original license, and the value
of protecting inventive activity through patents is preserved because
patent misuse is linked to the question of enforceability rather than
validity of patents. Therefore, the proposal avoids disrupting the patent system because it does not invalidate the patent that underlies
the license.
To understand NCE activity, it is further necessary to distinguish
between the doctrines of patent law and real property law. In direct
contrast with patent law, which seeks to harmonize the interests of
the public with the interests of the individual, real property law is primarily concerned with an individual’s right to exclude others.146 Although recent scholarship attempted to refocus the property doctrine
on relationships rather than boundaries, it is still arguably true that the
focus in real property law remains on relationships between private
parties,147 whereas in patent law, the focus is on the relationship between the inventor and the public.148 An important consequence of
this distinction is that the grant of a patent is viewed as a bilateral
contract between an individual and society, where a limited-term monopoly right is granted in exchange for disclosure.149 At the same
time, patent monopoly must serve a useful end, and NCEs do not
further this objective because they do not practice their patents.
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2. Contract
It is also important to be aware of the differences between the
contract law doctrine and patent law while keeping in mind that the
contract doctrine alone cannot be used to uphold license alienability
because it protects freedom of contract and does not provide defenses to contract formation that would apply in the NCE licensing
context.
The contract law doctrine, other than requiring that the parties
conform with the principles of good faith and fair dealing,150 seeks to
protect the freedom of individuals to craft their own terms so as to
maximize the private right to contract.151 Contract law therefore offers
very few mechanisms for rendering a contract unenforceable—
namely, mistake, unconscionability, and duress.152 When courts use
the principles of contract law to adjudicate disputes in patent licensing, licensees cannot effectively rely on any of these doctrines to invalidate unduly restrictive non-assignment clauses.153 These
doctrines are often predicated on the imbalance of power between
the licensor and the licensee,154 and courts are unlikely to find a power
inequity where both parties to a transaction are equally sophisticated
business entities.155
Therefore, the licensees are left with the only viable option—challenging the validity of the patent itself. This option, however, is expensive to litigate, and, furthermore, court decisions wreak undue havoc
on the patent industry. Instead, this Note proposes an approach that
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 203 Side A
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150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). (“Every contract imposes upon
each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”)
151. But see generally W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (freedom to
contract is subject to restraints imposed by public policy unless the imposition of such restraints
as against individuals is unconstitutional).
152. Lorelei Ritchie, Reconciling Contract Doctrine with Intellectual Property Law: An Interdisciplinary Solution, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 105, 156 (2008-2009) (citing
Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919, 923 (Mich. 1887) (mistake); Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral
Corp., 272 N.E.2d 533, 535 (N.Y. 1971) (duress); Wollums v. Horsley, 20 S.W. 781 (Ky. 1892)
(unconscionability).
153. See Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 779 F.3d
1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (attempts by NCE to license patents do not amount to extortion).
154. ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 509 (LexisNexis, 4th
ed. 2007) (contract law generally enforces only voluntary, informed agreements between mentally competent adults).
155. Id.; see also AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011) (deferring
to state law to interpret unconscionability and noting that a finding of unconscionability required
undue “oppression” or “surprise”); Agri-Mark, Inc. v. Niro, Inc., 233 F.Supp.2d 200, 212 (D.
Mass. 2002) (a high contractual limitation on damages was not unconscionable because both
parties were sophisticated business entities).
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would allow the courts to invalidate unduly restrictive non-assignability clauses in patent licensing agreements.
As discussed above, a license is a contract governed by the principles of contract law.156 However, standard defenses to contract formation, which allow a licensee to ask the court to invalidate an unduly
restrictive license agreement, are unlikely to apply. For example, the
unconscionability defense to contract, as articulated in Seabrook, relied on the facts that one party “(1) possessed superior legal
knowledge and (2) a scarce commodity that [the other party needed],
(3) knew [the other party] had not read or understood, nor (4) received
legal counsel regarding (5) the legally technical terms in (6) the fine
print of the [offending party’s] (7) lengthy contract.”157 Clearly, a license agreement between two business entities is unlikely to have
been formed under the conditions that meet these criteria and, in fact,
non-assignability clauses, no-challenge clauses, and similar provisions are standard tools of the trade in crafting licensing agreements
for both the contract and patent attorneys.158
3. Antitrust

12/28/2015 14:43:02

156. McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67 F.3d 917, 920 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Power Lift,
Inc. v. Weatherford Nipple-Up Sys., Inc., 871 F.2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“A [patent]
license agreement is a contract governed by ordinary principles of state contract law.”)).
157. SCOTT & KRAUS, supra note 154, at 510 (summarizing the Seabrook unconscionability
criteria).
158. See Ziff & Deming, supra note 6.
159. LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS
AND MONOPOLIES § 4:56 (4th ed. 2010) (citing E. Venetian Blind Co. v. Acme Steel Co., 188
F.2d 247 (4th Cir. 1951)).
160. Id. (discussing Sanford Redmond, Inc. v. Mid-America Dairymen, Inc., No. 85 Civ.
4574, 1992 WL 57090 (S.D. N.Y. 1992), aff’d, 993 F.2d 1534 (2d Cir. 1993)).
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To supplement the law of contracts, which alone does not provide
mechanisms to support alienability of patent licenses to business successors, a viable analytical framework is needed that would allow the
courts to correctly take into account the public-policy dimension of
patent law. One such exemplary framework is antitrust-based.
Under antitrust law, “an illegal provision in a patent license will
generally constitute patent misuse, which, as a matter of patent law,
renders the patent unenforceable.”159 Also, and more significantly, the
presence of an illegal provision in a licensing agreement may invalidate the agreement itself without invalidating the underlying patent.160
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Antitrust law seeks to level the playing field for producers with the
ultimate goal of benefiting the public.161 Therefore, as a matter of antitrust law, a business practice, which in itself may be lawful and appropriate from a business perspective, could be considered unlawful
if it is part of an unlawful scheme.162 Furthermore, the term “anti-competitive” is reserved for lawsuits that seek socially undesirable exclusion,163 and it therefore fits well in a scenario where NCEs wield a
disproportionate amount of power over other parties’ economic transactions. Consider the hypothetical presented in the Introduction supra: the “patent troll” included in its agreement with the small inventor
a term so restrictive that it effectively gave the “troll” undue control
over the small inventor’s ability to sell its motion-control mechanism,
an invention only partially related to the “troll’s” data transfer patent,
to Medical Devices, Inc. The Israel-based company was therefore unable to enter the U.S. market.
The policy principles that underlie antitrust law are consistent
with the Supreme Court’s recent decisions, discussed in Part II, to
limit the reach of NCEs by disfavoring non-producers in patent infringement disputes. For example, echoing the industry feedback in a
2012 congressional hearing on antitrust,164 the International Trade
Commission (ITC) recently introduced a pilot program to determine
whether NCEs meet the domestic industry requirement needed to
bring an infringement suit in the ITC administrative forum.165
Additionally, the ITC tightened the domestic industry requirement
in a judicial decision requiring that NCEs, in addition to demonstrating
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 204 Side A
12/28/2015 14:43:02

161. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2232 (2013) (citing
United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 308-311 (1948)) (“[I]n Line Material . . . the
Court held that the antitrust laws forbid a group of patentees, each owning one or more patents,
to cross-license each other, and, in doing so, to insist that each licensee maintain retail prices
set collectively by the patent holders.”).
162. The licensee and its successor are also subject to antitrust regulation. See
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSETS, supra note 19, at § 16.4. However, it is unlikely that the licensee, typically a small entity, and its business successor would be direct competitors “in the absence of the licensing arrangement.” See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N,
ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 5.7 (1995),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm#t57 [hereinafter DOJ AND FTC IP
ANTITRUST GUIDELINES].
163. Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property
Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 521 (2003).
164. Ryan Davis, ‘Patent Troll’ Suits Face New Obstacles at the ITC, LAW360 (Feb. 11,
2014, 7:21 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/509094/patent-troll-suits-face-new-obstaclesat-itc.
165. Id.
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a patent, show that at least one product practicing the patent exists.166
Although this decision is not binding on federal courts, it is significant
in two respects. First, it recognizes that the constructive enablement
standard, which allows patents in the absence of practicing products,
may result in patent enforcement for monetary gain rather than to promote competition. Second, the ITC decision finds a way to restrict
NCE activity in a way that is not disruptive to the patent system, by
limiting standing rather than seeking to change the enablement standard in patent law.
Similar to patent and contract law, the antitrust doctrine alone is
not sufficient to support license alienability because it does not provide all the necessary doctrinal mechanisms for doing so. In the context of patents, one applicable antitrust provision is the antimonopolization provision articulated in Section 2 of the Sherman
Act.167 However, in order to show that a practice is anti-competitive
under the Sherman Act, a patentee must have fraudulently procured
its patent.168 Additionally, to prevail in a Section 2 argument under, for
example, the essential facilities doctrine,169 both parties must be competitors.170 Neither is necessarily the case with NCEs.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, then, the antitrust-based approach recognizes that NCEs, as non-competitors, should enjoy a
narrower field of opportunities to bring infringement suits and shows
that it is possible to implement judicial rules that accomplish this policy
objective without disrupting the law of patentability.171 These two principles inform the argument for license alienability.
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 204 Side B
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166. Id.
167. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2004).
168. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2231 (2013) (citing Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174 (1965)
(“[E]nforcement of a patent procured by fraud may violate the Sherman Act”) (internal citations
omitted).
169. Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. & J. Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilities, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1187,
1190–91 (1999) (“A monopolist in control of a facility essential to other competitors must provide
reasonable access to that facility if it is feasible to do so”); see generally Elaine Johnston, Intellectual Property as an ‘Essential Facility’, PRACTISING LAW INST. (2004), http://jp.whitecase.com/files/Publication/c93f2d08-b2c5-492c-804bbd5dc51f74ed/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/15b3c953-2983-4ede-a055c17043b5c00d/00817_Elaine_Johnston_byline.pdf (discussing limited applicability of the essential facilities doctrine to intellectual property).
170. See, e.g., Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 837 (1952).
171. Actavis Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2231 (holding that a pharmaceutical substance patentee’s
attempt to set higher-than-average licensing fees in a settlement agreement with competitor
was not immune from antitrust scrutiny, even if the agreement’s anticompetitive effects fell within
the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent).
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IV. ARGUING LICENSE ALIENABILITY
A. Restraints on Alienability as Patent Misuse in Light of Case
Law
This section reconciles the proposed rule with case law, presents
an additional doctrine (shop right) to supplement the Princo rule analysis, and discusses procedural aspects of litigating alienability of patent licenses to business successors of the licensee.
1. NCE Activity as an Anti-Competitive Practice under the
Princo Rule

12/28/2015 14:43:02

172. AM. BAR. ASSOC., SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MISUSE:
LICENSING AND LITIGATION 1, at 1 (2000) [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MISUSE].
173. Id. at 127–28.
174. Id. at 75.
175. Id. at 82–84.
176. Id. at 86–87.
177. Id. at 66.
178. Jessica L. Braeger, Antiassignment Clauses, Mergers, and the Myth About Federal
Preemption of Application of State Contract Law to Patent License Agreements, 50 DRAKE L.
REV. 639, 642 (2002).

37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 205 Side A

Attempts by non-creative entities to exclude business successors
of a licensee by enforcing anti-assignment clauses run counter to the
principle of patent misuse, which seeks to protect market participants
from anti-competitive actions by third parties. The doctrine of patent
misuse applies when an improper attempt exists on the part of the
patent holder to extend the scope of the patent, and such attempts
are especially likely to be considered improper if they contravene antitrust law.172 Because patent grants create monopolies, the misuse
doctrine is intended to check the temptation to manipulate the intellectual property system to ends that it was never intended to serve.173
In the licensing context, conduct that has been challenged as patent
misuse includes tying arrangements,174 territorial, field-of-use, and
customer restrictions,175 grantbacks that are broader in scope than
improvements to the licensed patents,176 and bad-faith enforcement
of intellectual property rights.177
A typical anti-assignment clause in a patent license will prohibit
the right or power to assign the contract to third parties.178 Therefore,
of particular interest here is the application by courts of the doctrine
of patent misuse in the context of contracts that attempt to unduly
exceed the scope of the patent right.
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179. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1318–30 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
180. Id. at 1328 (“When [] contractual conditions violate public policy, however, as in the
case of price-fixing conditions and tying restraints, the underlying patents become unenforceable, and the patentee loses its right to sue for infringement or breach of contract.”); accord.,
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Ink Techs. Printer Supplies, LLC, No. 1:10-CV-564, 2014 WL 1276133, at
*6 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 27, 2014).
181. In re CFLC, Inc., 89 F.3d 673, 680 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Because federal law governs the
assignability of nonexclusive patent licenses, and because federal law makes such licenses
personal and assignable only with the consent of the licensor, the . . . license is not assumable
and assignable in bankruptcy . . . .”).
182. Intell. Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., No. 1:13-CV-00740, 2013 WL 6682981
(E.D. Va. Dec. 18, 2013).
183. Sanofi-Aventis v. Apotex, Inc., 659 F.3d 1171, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
184. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 (West 2013) (the Hatch-Waxman Act).
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CAFC, in Princo, held that attempts to impose conditions on a
licensee that exceed the scope of the patent right constitute patent
misuse.179 CAFC also noted that, if patent misuse is established on
public policy grounds, the underlying contract is rendered unenforceable.180
At the same time, however, courts have also upheld non-assignability clauses and refused to recognize NCE licensing arrangements
as anti-competitive. For example, in In Re CFLC the Ninth Circuit held
that a patent holder had an exclusive right to prevent such an assignment,181 and the United States District Court for the Eastern District,
in an unpublished opinion, refused to recognize NCE patent infringement allegations as patent misuse.182 Additionally, CAFC, in SanofiAventis v. Apotex, Inc., has recently held that the defense of patent
misuse is not available to a presumptive infringer simply because a
patentee engages in some kind of wrongful commercial conduct, even
conduct that may have anticompetitive effects.183
Notwithstanding these recent decisions, the proposal that antiassignment clauses in NCE licensing contracts constitute patent misuse under the Princo rule is not inconsistent with case law. The In Re
CFLC decision, for example, pertained to a situation where the licensee declared bankruptcy, and, in this scenario, it was appropriate to
resolve the conflict between the patent holder and the licensee’s successor in favor of the patent holder because the patent holder was in
a better position than the licensee’s debtor to use the patent license
in a productive fashion.
In Sanofi-Aventis, the parties were competitors disputing the extent to which statutorily permissible184 manufacture and sales of generic medication constituted infringement. Further, the court
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distinguished Princo, noting that wrongful commercial conduct at issue was a failure to comply with notice requirements rather than attempts to unduly enlarge the scope of the patented invention.185
2. Linking License Alienability with Patent Misuse though the
Shop Right Doctrine

12/28/2015 14:43:02

185. Sanofi-Aventis, 659 F.3d at 1182 (“‘[T]he key inquiry under the patent misuse doctrine
is whether . . . the patentee has impermissibly broadened the physical or temporal scope of the
patent grant and has done so in a manner that has anticompetitive effects.’ BMS’s failure to
disclose the oral side deal with Apotex, and its false certification to the FTC regarding the same,
in no way broadened the scope of the 265 patent grant.” (quoting Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
186. Princo, 616 F.3d at 1318–30.
187. Ushakoff v. United States, 179 Ct. Cl. 780 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
188. Neon Signal Devices v. Alpha-Claude Neon Corp., 54 F.2d 793, 796 (W.D. Pa. 1931).
189. Speedplay, Inc. v. Bepop, Inc., 211 F.3d 1245, 1251–52 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
190. Id.
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The shop right doctrine presents an additional mechanism to argue that NCE restrictions on license alienability to licensee’s business
successors constitute patent misuse. This doctrine supports both the
Princo rule and license alienability, and further underscores the importance of considering the licensee and its successors’ ability to productively use a patent.
The first prong of the Princo rule posits that unduly extending patent scope constitutes patent misuse.186 This Note argues that restrictions on license assignments to business successors in effect
unduly extend the reach of an NCE patent, and this proposal finds
support in the doctrine of shop right, rooted in patent law. Although a
shop right confers on the licensee the right to practice a patent but
not to assign it,187 courts have made an exception to this rule when
there is “a complete succession of the entire business and good will
of [the licensee]”.188
Policy principles underlying license alienability are discussed, for
example, in Speedplay, Inc. v. Beebop, Inc., where CAFC noted, in
dictum, that a patent owner does not hold an absolute right to withhold
permission to the licensee to assign the license to a third party.189 The
court interpreted the parties’ licensing agreement, which stipulated
that the right to assign shall not be withheld “unreasonably,” to mean
that the only reasonable basis for prohibiting assignment of the license would be an impediment to the owner’s consideration for entering the original agreement.190 Such consideration, as determined
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191. Id.
192. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1318–30 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
193. Id. at 1329.
194. Intell. Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., No. 1:13-CV-00740, 2013 WL
6682981, at *9 (E.D. Va. Dec. 18, 2013) (“Ulterior or bad motives do not deprive a patent holder
of its right to enforce a patent; and a patent misuse defense cannot be based on ‘misuse in the
air.’ Rather, ‘[t]he misuse must be of the patent in suit.’”).
195. Id.
196. Id. at *10.
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by the court, consisted largely of protecting the owner’s ongoing royalty stream.191
If we apply the reasoning articulated in Speedplay to the hypothetical scenario discussed in the Introduction, where the licensee,
Small Inventor, Inc., unsuccessfully attempted to transfer its license
rights to a business successor, Medical Devices, Inc., it becomes
clear that permitting the licensee to assign its contract, presumably
on the same terms, would not adversely impact the patent owner’s
royalty revenues. Any other conclusion would effectively afford the
patent owner a benefit not commensurate with the scope of the patent
at issue by allowing the owner to exercise undue influence over the
licensee’s business decisions. Such an outcome would constitute patent misuse as defined by CAFC in Princo.192
The second prong of the Princo rule states that misuse in the air
is not sufficient.193 Similar to the Ninth Circuit, the District Court for
the Eastern District, in Intellectual Ventures, refused to uphold the
doctrine of patent misuse as a defense to allegations of bad-faith patent enforcement because the attempted licensor, an NCE, attempted
to enforce a portfolio of patents. The prospective licensee pointed to
this activity in the aggregate rather than to any specific patent to support its allegations of bad-faith enforcement, and at issue was the appropriateness of claiming patent misuse by the attempted licensee
before a license was finalized.194 The court, citing a long line of precedent, noted that allegations of “misuse in the air” were not sufficient.195
The facts, however, are radically different when an established
licensor-licensee relationship exists. Because there was not a clearly
identifiable patent in Intellectual Ventures, the court concluded that
the prospective licensor had not demanded from the prospective licensee any “concessions beyond the monopoly power created by an
enforceable patent,”196 which, as discussed above, is not the case
when an unqualified right to withhold an assignment to a business
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successor would effectively exceed the scope of such monopoly
power.
B. Procedural Aspects of Arguing Illegality of Anti-Assignment
Clauses through Patent Misuse
1. Timing197

2. Jurisdiction and Choice of Law
The second question related to procedure is jurisdiction and
choice of law. The issue of alienability of patent licenses should be
litigated in federal courts, similar to other patent-related disputes, and,
notably, this approach does not conflict with existing jurisdictional law

12/28/2015 14:43:02

197. For an in-depth discussion see Andrew Schwerin, Declaratory Judgment Suits Against
Patent Trolls, RIIPL INST. FOR INFO. POLICY & LAW (2014), http://riipl.rutgers.edu/andrew-schwerin-declaratory-judgment-suits-against-patent-trolls/.
198. See Jennifer R. Saionz, Declaratory Judgment Actions in Patent Cases: The Federal
Circuit’s Response to Medimmune v. Genentech, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 161 (2008) (discussing the “reasonable apprehension” standard relaxed in light of MedImmune’s “totality of the circumstances” test).
199. Id. at 189.
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This Note proposes expanding the doctrine of patent misuse to
support claims that anti-assignment clauses in patent licenses, when
the licensor is an NCE, may be unduly restrictive because they exceed the scope of the patent. The first question with respect to procedural aspects of bringing such claims is the question of timing, and,
inasmuch as timing affects ownership of the disputed license, the related question is who can bring an action.
Complaints seeking to invalidate restrictions on assignment
could be brought before or after infringement is alleged.198 If brought
pre-infringement, the licensee or its successor could seek a declaratory judgment invalidating the restrictive clause in the licensing agreement.
If brought post-infringement, the licensee or its successor could
bring a counter-claim seeking to invalidate the clause or, in the alternative, supplement its defense of patent unenforceability.199
Additionally, the licensee or its successor could bring such claims
or counter-claims either before or after the change-of-control transaction occurs. As such, the analytical framework proposed here does
not impose restrictions on either timing or the parties in suit.
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in either contracts or patents. While state contract law governs interpretation of patent licenses,200 federal patent law controls on the issue
of license alienability in order to promote innovation and because the
analysis of license alienability issues is rooted in the law of intellectual
property rights.201 CAFC successfully harmonized state contract law
with the law of patents.202
Additionally, federal courts have jurisdiction over counter-claims
or defenses to infringement.203 As to the choice of law, interpretation
of the contract language as to the extent to which assignability is restricted and determining whether a change-of-ownership transaction
occurred would be a matter of state law,204 whether contractually stipulated or not, and arguments related to establishing patent misuse on
the ground of the presence of an anti-assignment clause in the license
agreement could be interpreted under federal law of patents.205
V. RESPONSE TO COUNTERARGUMENTS
Likely counterarguments to the proposal advanced in this Note
include the following: first, NCE activity should not be limited because
NCEs are valuable market players that provide much-needed liquidity
in the market of intellectual property rights; second, patent misuse has
already been unsuccessfully argued in the context of NCE licensing;
third, the proposal may adversely affect non-practicing entities that
add value, such as universities; and fourth, the proposal may run
counter to the well-established principle of freedom of contract. These
counterarguments are addressed below.
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 207 Side B
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200. Cincom Sys., Inc. v. Novelis Corp., 581 F.3d 431, 437 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting that “state
contract law will govern the interpretation of a license because a license is merely a type of
contract.”).
201. Id., see also In re CFLC, Inc., 89 F.3d 673, 679 (9th Cir. 1996) (federal law must govern
to prevent free assignability and to promote creativity); In re Alltech Plastics, Inc., 71 B.R. 686,
689 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1987) (“Because ‘[t]he rights of the patent owner to license the use of
his invention is [sic] a creature of federal common law False [i]t follows that questions regarding
the assignability of patent licenses are controlled by federal law’”) (internal citations omitted).
202. Karen E. Sandrik, Formal but Forgiving: A New Approach to Patent Assignments, 66
RUTGERS L. REV. 299, 305 (2014).
203. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1338 (West 2011).
204. See, e.g., Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1061 (2013) (refusing to interpret a legal
malpractice claim, a matter of state law, under federal patent law because the federal issue
needed to be “necessary for resolution,” “actually disputed,” “substantial,” and consistent with
public policy); see also Ziff & Deming, supra note 50, at 3.
205. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (noting, however,
a narrow application of misuse to limit patent scope because 28 U.S.C. § 1338 misuse is a
judicially created doctrine); but see Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1061.
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A. NCEs As Market Intermediaries
Opponents of limiting NCE activity argue that NCEs provide market liquidity.206 For example, one study, commissioned by the Federal
Trade Commission, found that non-creative entities account for 75%
of all activity in patent licensing markets.207 The same study, however,
found that less than 25% of this licensing activity leads to innovation
in industries that heavily rely on intellectual property.208
In other words, it is questionable whether the increased transaction costs associated with procuring, managing and litigating patents
are justified by patent commercialization facilitated by NCEs. Market
intermediaries play an important role in facilitating property exchange
but, as noted supra, the anticompetitive effects of such economic activity must not exceed the aggregate benefits that market intermediaries provide to the economy.209 Market disintermediation benefits
both producers210 and consumers.211
The largest technology companies clearly view NCEs as a problem rather than as facilitators of commercial activity, as indicated by
recent efforts of these companies to avoid infringement litigation by
NCEs by entering alternative licensing arrangements with other operating entities that practice the patents they own. Defensive patent aggregators and cross-licensing arrangements are examples of these
efforts.212
Technology companies form alliances to jointly purchase patents
from smaller inventors, thereby taking these patents off the market so
as to prevent NCEs from acquiring and enforcing them. Technology
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 208 Side A
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206. See generally Hannibal Travis, Patent Alienability and Its Discontents, 17 TUL. J. TECH.
& INTELL. PROP. 109 (2014).
207. Mark S. Popofsky & Michael D. Laufert, Patent Assertion Entities and Antitrust: Operating Company Patent Transfers, 12 AM. BAR. ASSOC.: THE ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 2 (2013).
208. Id.
209. DOJ AND FTC IP ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 161, at § 3.4 (“The Agencies’ general approach in analyzing a licensing restraint under the rule of reason is to inquire whether
the restraint is likely to have anticompetitive effects and, if so, whether the restraint is reasonably
necessary to achieve procompetitive benefits that outweigh those anticompetitive effects. . . .).
210. ERIC J. ARNOULD ET AL., MARKET DISINTERMEDIATION AND PRODUCER VALUE CAPTURE:
THE CASE OF FAIR TRADE COFFEE IN NICARAGUA, PERU AND GUATEMALA 4 (2006), http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/marketingfacpub/11.
211. Case Study: Dell—Distribution and Supply Chain Innovation, MARS (2011),
http://www.marsdd.com/mars-library/case-study-dell-distribution-and-supply-chain-innovation/.
212. Martha Belcher & John Casey, Hacking the Patent System: A Guide to Alternative
Patent System for Innovators 3-5, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (May 2014),
https://www.eff.org/files/2014/05/29/hacking_the_patent_system.pdf.
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companies also form alliances aimed at creating common pools of
patents.
Once such initiative is Google’s License on Transfer (LOT) program, which aims to reduce the number of patents available to
NCEs.213 Under this program, participants agree to license, royaltyfree, their patent portfolios to each other, but agree that licenses will
become enforceable only if a participant decides to transfer its patent
portfolio to an NCE. Thus, participants intentionally encumber their
intellectual property title with licenses to other operating entities, receiving, in exchange, an assurance that in the event some of these
patents are transferred to NCEs, the risk of infringement litigation by
NCEs against other LOT participants will dissipate because the patents will already have been licensed to these participants.214 In summary, technology companies aim to reduce the number of
enforceable patents available to NCEs, thereby reducing liquidity,
which shows that these companies see NCE activity as costly rather
than beneficial to the industry.215
Notably, the LOT licensing agreement includes an exception stipulating that licenses transferred to participants’ business successors
rather than NCEs remain unenforceable as against other participants.
Specifically, as articulated by Google, Inc.,
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213. Id.
214. LOTNET, http://www.lotnet.com/lotnet-solution/index.cfm (last visited Aug. 9, 2015).
215. Id. at http://www.lotnet.com/patent-assertion-problem/index.cfm (“The balance of revenue obtained by operating companies versus costs expended to defend against [NCEs] is
orders of magnitude in favor of costs.”).
216. Id.; see also LOT Agreement, LOTNET (July 7, 2014), http://www.lotnet.com/userfiles/files/LOT%20Agreement%20(v1_3-7_7_14).pdf.
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“[t]here are two principal exceptions where the transfer of patents
will not trigger a license under the LOT Agreement. The first is a
transfer of patents to another current LOT Network participant. The
second is a transfer that is part of a legitimate M&A or spin-out activity. . . . These exceptions allow companies sufficient room to utilize and dispose of their intellectual property in ways that maintain
value to support the growth and performance of their business,
while giving active participants a royalty-free license to protect them
from patent sales to non-participants, e.g., PAEs.” (emphasis
added).216
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Consistent with the proposal advanced in this Note, the LOT
agreement defines business successors as entities that assume ownership of a participant’s patents as a result of mergers, change-ofcontrol transactions, and spin-offs.
In the event the successor chooses not to become a member of
the LOT network within six months, the licenses simply expire. This
provision is fully in accord with the proposal advanced in this Note in
two ways: first, the industry views title encumbrances as harmful, rather than beneficial, to operating entities, and, second, the industry
supports the free choice of successor companies to continue or terminate the cross-licensing arrangement, with an apparent goal of minimizing the impact of title encumbrances on change-of-control
negotiations and thus preserving the value of patents at issue.
B. B&N v. MOSAID, Inc. As Distinguishable Legal Precedent
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217. In re Certain Handheld Elec. Computing Devices, Related Software, & Components
Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-769, USITC Order No. 32 (Jan. 31, 2012) (order granting motion for
summary determination).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
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Patent misuse has already been unsuccessfully argued in the
context of NCE licensing. Barnes & Noble (B&N), a licensee of
Google, Inc.’s Android™ operating system used in computer tablet
technology, recently accused MOSAID, Inc., a patent aggregation alliance (an NCE) formed by Microsoft, Inc. and Nokia, Inc., of patent
misuse. The alleged goal was to make Android™, and consequently
B&N tablet computers, prohibitively expensive, and thus perpetuate
Microsoft’s dominance in PC operating systems.217 After several
rounds of unsuccessful licensing negotiations, Microsoft, Inc. brought
suit, alleging that B&N infringed its patents.218 B&N brought a counterclaim with the ITC alleging patent misuse as an affirmative defense to
infringement.219 The ITC court did not find patent misuse.220
The proposal advanced in this Note is not inconsistent with the
court’s reasoning. Notably, the court relied on the Princo rule stating
that, first, misuse must be related to specific patents, and, second,
the goal of the licensing activity must have been intended to broaden
the scope of the patent.221 The court found that B&N failed to identify
particular patents in controversy because Microsoft had attempted to
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license a portfolio without identifying each individual patent.222 This
situation is drastically different from the scenario addressed in this
Note, where a licensing agreement would already exist and, thus, the
patent at issue would be clearly identifiable. Thus, a complaint or defense brought by the licensee would not fail the patent-in-suit prong223
of the Princo test.
Further, CAFC noted that B&N did not meet the second prong of
the Princo test—undue extensions of scope of the patent.224 First, the
court stated that, in light of case law,225 Microsoft’s attempt to extract
high royalties was permissible because the doctrine of patent monopoly does not impose a ceiling on royalties.226 In the license assignability scenario, however, the monetary value of royalties due to the
NCE would not be at issue. Rather, the proposal simply attempts to
remove the barriers to the freedom of operation of the licensees and
their successors. In fact, limiting NCE ability to negotiate with licensee
successors would protect the NCE’s position—because one version
of the proposal articulated in this Note would invalidate the anti-assignability clause rather than the entire licensing agreement, the NCE
could continue receiving royalties from its licensee’s successor on the
same terms as before.227
Second, the ITC court in MOSAID noted that Microsoft did not
unduly expand the breadth of scope of its patents when it attempted
to impose field-of-use restrictions on B&N by limiting operating system versions and upgrades.228 In contrast, field-of-use restrictions are
not at issue in regards to the licensor-licensee relationship.
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 209 Side B
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222. Id/
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. (“A patent empowers the owner to extract royalties as high as he can negotiate with
the leverage of that monopoly.” Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964). Indeed, the patent
laws even permit unilateral refusals to license patents. See SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d
1195, 1204 (2d Cir. 1981); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4). Accordingly, this is not misuse.”)
226. Id. However, note that CAFC denounced the 25% rule. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft
Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“This court now holds as a matter of Federal Circuit
law that the 25 percent rule of thumb is a fundamentally flawed tool for determining a baseline
royalty rate in a hypothetical negotiation.”).
Also, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2231 (2013) created a multi-factor
analysis to follow under § 271(d)(4).
227. This would have passed the test articulated in Actavis. See Fed. Trade Comm’n. v.
Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2231.
228. In re Certain Handheld Elec. Computing Devices, Related Software, & Components
Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-769, USITC Order No. 32 (Jan. 31, 2012) (order granting motion for
summary determination).
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Field-of-use restrictions arise when both parties to the agreement
practice the technology covered by the patent at issue or when one
practicing entity attempts to use its patents as a sword through an
NCE.229 Because NCEs do not practice their patents, the first scenario
involving two competitors in a licensor-licensee relationship is not
within the scope of this proposal, and, with respect to the second scenario, a distinct advantage of the proposal as articulated in this Note
is that there is not a need to examine the provenance of the NCE to
determine whether it was created by the licensee’s competitor. The
restriction at issue is the anti-assignability provision rather than a
field-of-use limitation, and our proposal borrows from the antitrust
framework to extend the doctrine of patent misuse rather than rely on
the antitrust doctrine exclusively as was done by B&N.230
In summary, the B&N argument in MOSAID required a showing
of patent misuse to prove an antitrust violation by a competitor, and
the court was understandably reluctant to make a policy decision on
whether it was allowable for practicing entities to use patents against
competitors.231 The scope of the issue presented in this Note, in contrast, is much narrower and aims to encourage corporate investment
in innovation by making it easier for companies to acquire potentially
profitable resources. To that end, field-of-use issues would not be
raised, and the licensee’s argument for assignability would not fail the
second prong of the Princo test.
C. Effect on Non-Practicing but Value-Adding Entities

12/28/2015 14:43:02

229. See Intellectual Property Misuse, supra note 172.
230. Certain Handheld Elec. Computing Devices, Related Software, & Components
Thereof, Order No. 32, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-769 (Jan. 31, 2012) (order granting motion for
summary determination).
231. For an examination of possible arguments to support the assertion that transfers of IP
assets to NCEs may violate antitrust laws, see POPOFSKY & LAUFERT, supra note 207.
232. Dennis S. Corgill, Competitive Injury and Non-Exclusive Patent Licensees, 71 U. PITT.
L. REV. 641, 642–43 (2010). (“Consider, for example, a university that owns a patent on a medical device invented by one of its professors. The university may choose not to practice the
invention itself for the simple reason that the university does not have the requisite manufacturing facilities or distribution channels.”).
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Proponents of the free-market approach to regulating NCEs argue that any restrictions on NCE activity will adversely impact nonpracticing entities that add value—for example, universities.232 In-
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233. Id. (“That leaves the university with the option of licensing. Depending upon a variety
of economic circumstances, the university may opt for non-exclusive licensees. For example,
the university may not want a single, exclusive licensee to obtain monopoly power, which would
permit the exclusive licensee to raise price and restrict output. Instead, the university may prefer
a system of non-exclusive licensees who will compete on price and expand output.”).
234. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201 (West 2010).
235. 35 U.S.C.A. § 282(b)(1) (West 2012).
236. See Hannibal Travis, supra note 206.
237. ASSOC. OF AM. UNIVS., UNIVERSITY RESEARCH: THE ROLE OF FEDERAL FUNDING (Jan.
2011), http://www.aau.edu/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=11588 [hereinafter AMERICAN
UNIVERSITIES].
238. 35 U.S.C.A. § 202(c)(4) (The university may elect to retain rights, provided that it timely
files a patent. However, “with respect to any invention in which the [funded party] elects rights,
the Federal agency shall have a nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up license to
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deed, universities are in a position to conceive of inventions and reduce them to practice without commercializing them. Instead, they
may assign or license their patents to private-industry entities.233
This proposal, however, would not negatively impact productive
non-practicing entities for several reasons. First, a key strength of the
proposal is its focus on contracting activity between NCEs and practicing entities rather than on patent validity. A targeted solution for
curtailing NCE activity eliminates the need to invalidate the entire patent held by the NCE: as explained above, the argument that restrictions on assignability are illegal can be raised outside the context
of raising patent misuse as a defense to effectuate patent invalidity in
infringement litigation. This can be done in two ways: first, the licensee may seek a declaratory judgment pertaining only to its contract
with the NCE and not to the underlying patent.234 Second, patent misuse supports unenforceability rather than patent invalidity.235
As a result, the outcome of the analytical process proposed here
would have no impact on the legal status of non-creative entities or
on the requirements for patentability. Non-creative entities, including
universities, could continue to operate without the need to show evidence of use in order to obtain or retain rights to a patent.
Arguably, making it more difficult for NCEs to control transferability of licenses to their patents could make these entities unwilling to
procure patents from universities.236 However, it is unclear whether
“patent trolls” are big purchasers of university patents, especially in
light of the fact that university research projects are funded by private
industry and government,237 which increases the likelihood that these
entities will become owners of the patents resulting from such research, either by contract or statutorily,238 which, in turn, will create
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title encumbrances that would make such purchases unattractive for
“patent trolls”. In fact, 60% of university research spending comes
from federal funding.239
D. Freedom of Contract

12/28/2015 14:43:02

practice or have practiced for or on behalf of the United States any subject invention throughout
the world.”).
239. See AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES, supra note 237 (“In 2009, [the federal government supported] about $33 billion of universities’ total annual R&D spending of $55 billion”).
240. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
241. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1173, 1176–77 (1983) (a contract of adhesion is standard form contract presented on a take-itor-leave-it basis).
242. Content Extraction and Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 776 F.3d
1343, 1351 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Treating meritless litigation as form of extortion punishable
under RICO would substantially chill even valid court petitioning . . . .” (citing Deck v. Engineered Laminates, 349 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 2003)).
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Another potential counterargument is rooted in the principle of
freedom of contract, which stipulates that private entities should be
free to enter contracts without judicial or government interference.240
The proposal articulated in this Note, however, is not contrary to this
principle. NCE licensing contracts cannot be considered contracts of
adhesion,241 which are subject to invalidity under the doctrine of unconscionability, because both the NCE and its licensee are likely business entities sophisticated enough to bargain over the terms of the
contract.
An argument could be made, however, that licensees are not free
to refuse to enter licensing agreements because they would otherwise
be subject to infringement actions. For example, an accused infringer
recently brought a counter-claim of extortion, which was rejected by
CAFC in Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank
on the ground that the patent owner’s filing of an infringement lawsuit
did not rise to the level of extortion sufficient to support an extortion
claim.242 At the same time, the law of patents is firmly rooted in the
doctrines of patent monopoly and market choice, and neither of these
doctrines provides mechanisms for prospective licensees to reject restrictions on license assignment to third parties in license negotiations. Therefore, a narrowly tailored judicial solution articulated in this
Note could fill the gaps by helping licensees challenge restrictions on
assignment without disrupting the patent system and without disrupting freedom of contract; the proposal does not seek to invalidate entire license agreements.
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Another counterargument is potential liability for tortious interference with contractual relations.243 When a corporate transfer occurs
by operation of law or despite the license holder’s objections, the business successor would not be held liable. Tortious interference, importantly, requires a deprivation of the contract holder of its
consideration.244 In this case, no such deprivation would occur because the NCE would be free to agree to continue receiving royalties
from the business successor on the same terms. The NCE’s position,
therefore, would not be compromised. In a similar vein, no disruption
of a business relationship245 would occur because the successor
would be free to assume the licensee’s contract and because the licensee is unlikely to enter a contract that reduces rather than increases revenues from practicing the invention.
In addition, the proposal articulated in this Note would not disrupt
the existing jurisdictional framework. Although contract issues are a
matter of state law,246 it is not inconceivable that licensees may seek
redress in federal courts that have jurisdiction over patent matters. In
fact, federal courts, in adjudicating these disputes, could apply contractually agreed upon choice-of-law provisions247 stipulated by the
NCE and the licensee or its successor.
CONCLUSION
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243. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 978 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984).
244. Id. at 989 (the defendant must cause the interference and the resulting loss).
245. See, e.g., McGreevy v. Daktronics, Inc., 156 F.3d 837 (8th Cir. 1998) (interference with
business relations).
246. Cincom Sys., Inc. v. Novelis Corp., 581 F.3d 431, 437 (6th Cir. 2009).
247. SOFTWARE CONTRACTS, supra note 87, at 87.
248. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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Non-creative entities contribute to rising costs of innovation by
contractually requiring their licensees to seek NCE consent to subsequent license transfers. However, while courts are working to develop
solutions to address this problem, drastic changes to the patent system are not desirable. One possible way of gradually limiting the reach
of NCEs is to expand the doctrine of patent misuse, which supports
the unenforceability defense to patent infringement, to construe restraints on alienation of patent licenses as patent misuse under the
Princo248 rule. This approach is consistent with substantive and procedural requirements of both federal patent law and state contract
law. Additionally, it is consistent with the case law on the treatment of
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IP licensees. Finally, the proposed approach is tailored with a precision sufficient to minimize shock to the patent system because it
avoids the question of patent invalidity and does not seek to alter the
ability of NCEs to procure patents.
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